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Israeli policies deny Palestinian Jerusalemites 
with blue identification cards, who live in 
either J1 (the part of East Jerusalem annexed 
and incorporated into the Israeli municipality 
of Jerusalem after the 1967 War) or J2 
(populous Palestinian localities in eastern 
and northern Jerusalem that were excluded 
from the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem), 
their fundamental residency rights to adequate 
housing and freedom of movement and their 
rights to health, work, education, and family 
life. These policies include the plethora 
of (Israeli) legislative measures aimed at 
displacing Palestinians from within Jerusalem 
municipality boundaries by revoking these 
Palestinians’ residency rights in the city.1
Furthermore, the apartheid wall2or 
separation wall was constructed not on the 
pre-1967 borders, but on the Palestinian 
territories and isolates 43 percent of the 
Jerusalem governorate, including the route 
of the wall around East Jerusalem following 
the municipal boundaries in places around 
settlements and Palestinian villages, towns 
and neighborhoods. Jewish settlement blocs 
are included, integrating Jewish settlers with 
other Israelis, while at the same time ignoring 
the fabric of Palestinian life. Instead, the wall 
fragmented East Jerusalem, dividing families 
and whole communities, and isolating East 
Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. 
Some neighborhoods within the municipal 
borders (Kufr ‘Aqab and Semiramis in the 
north; Ras Khamis, Shu‘fat refugee camp, 
and Dahyat al-Salam in the east) are relegated 
to the West Bank side of the wall. Nearly 
fifty-five thousand Palestinian Jerusalemites 
reside in these neighborhoods. In addition, an 
unknown number of Palestinian Jerusalemites 
(estimates range from forty thousand to sixty 
thousand) continue to live outside Jerusalem’s 
municipal borders.3
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is particularlyprofound; the separation wall has hastened a process of economic and social 
decline that is imposing severe hardship on Palestinian Jerusalemites. This research 
examines the impact of the separation wall on the lives of married Jerusalemite women 
who live in what we will refer to as “Area D”: the areas within the Israeli municipality 
of Jerusalem, but located on the West Bank side ofthe separation wall.4 These women 
have been facing many challenges and have been trapped within constrained places, and 
spouses, who own different identification cards have been separated from their families 
by the separation wall and various checkpoints. 
This paper investigates the difficulties that Jerusalemite women and their families 
face as the result of having different types of IDs. It looks into the extent of changes in 
women’s everyday lives, and the sense of their connections to a particular place when 
they move out of their homes to new homes after the construction of the separation wall. 
As Victoria Redclift has noted, “the loss of physical place is all too often associated 
with loss of state protection.”5 In this case, much of Jerusalem’s Palestinian population 
has been left no choice but to move out of their homes have no actual state protection. 
We examine women’s feeling of security and safety in their homes, as they daily cross 
military checkpoints and interact with Israeli soldiers in “militarized spaces.”6 We also 
examined women’s fear of deprivation of their rights, and being separated from their 
families and communities.
Methodology
To investigate the residency rights of Jerusalemite women living in the “border area” of 
East Jerusalem, we used multiple research methods, both qualitative and quantitative. 
Mainly we adopted a qualitative research methodology to explore complexities of the 
research target place and population. This methodology includes participant observations, 
in-depth interviews, focus groups, and unstructured interviews. We view the latter as 
particularly important, given that “one of the primary tools of oppression of women in 
the maintenance of silence about their experiences and perspectives.”7 Finally, we carried 
out a sample survey to get statistical results that aim to describe the characteristics and 
experiences of a population.8
The sample population consists of 154 married Jerusalemite women with spouses 
holding different residency statuses, and thus different identity cards. These women were 
recruited from places that are easily accessible to women. A variation of convenience 
sampling was used including “snowball sampling,” in which participants invite others 
in the same social group to join the sample. The research population live in three border 
zones: first, zone D, including the neighborhoods of Kufr ‘Aqab in the north, and Ras 
Khamis and Shu‘fat refugee camp in the northeast of Jerusalem; second, Areas B and C; 
third, the J1 area, where the majority of the residents hold a blue (Jerusalem) identification 
card, while some hold a green (Palestinian) identification card and residence permits.
Conceptualizing and analyzing the notions of space, place, and displacement, the 
researchers address two themes. The first is Jerusalem’s boundaries, and in particular 
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sovereignty in East Jerusalem, including the separation wall and the Israel’s aims to expand 
Jerusalem’s boundaries and maintains its illegal colonial control over East Jerusalem. It 
must be noted that Israel applies its strategy to control the boundaries of greater Jerusalem 
by intensifying Jewish settlements and displacing the Palestinian population, which is 
seen through the Israeli lens as a “demographic threats” to the Zionist project.9 We argue 
that the whole process of expansion, land confiscation, depopulation, and segregation 
has a minimal impact on women and gender relations.
The second theme is that of “stateless indigeneity,” which includes the displacement 
and relocation of indigenous populations, the disruption of their lives, and the loss of 
their humanity, nationality, and citizenship rights. We claim that “stateless indigenous 
people,” who live on their own land, are unacknowledged, neglected, and marginalized; 
meanwhile, a “settler colonial” population lives on the appropriated land and enjoys full 
human and citizenship rights. 
The Separation Wall and Residency Rights of Jerusalemite Women
Israeli laws allow the revocation of the residency right of any Palestinian Jerusalemite 
whose “center of life” has not been in Jerusalem for seven consecutive years.10 Palestinian 
residents of East Jerusalem who have moved out to live with their spouses in the West 
Bank or elsewhere, for example, run the risk of having their residency rights permanently 
revoked. The rate of revocation has escalated since 2008, after the separation wall 
was completed, providing evidence that one of the wall’s goals was to further Jewish 
demographic domination over the city. Thus, Palestinians are effectively deprived of the 
basic right to reside in their homeland, hometown, and home-space.11
The research data shows the segmentation, ghettoization, segregation, and 
fragmentation of the Palestinian Jerusalemite population. The research sample falls into 
three main groups, whose experience of this regime is shaped by their place of residency 
and the residency status and identity documents held within their family. The first group, 
making up 48.7 percentof the research sample, live in Area D. The family members of 
those women hold different IDs (blue and green). In this community with mixed IDs, the 
effects of racial categorization and segregation are obvious. Indeed, the wall clearly serves 
an apartheid function, acting like a racial filter. It permits Israeli settlers to pass freely 
through its checkpoints, while blocking access to the majority of Palestinians, including 
those who are originally Jerusalemites but do not carry the Israeli (blue) identification 
or residency permits. This includes Palestinians Jerusalemites who live in Area D. 
Whereas some Palestinians – those with blue IDs – are able to pass back and forth with 
a minimum of difficulty, the impact is racially skewed in that it separates Palestinians 
from their families and puts restrictions and conditions on them that are never imposed 
on Jews, no matter where they reside. 
Another segment of the research sample is made up of those living in neighborhoods 
within the municipality border. These comprise 27.9 percent of the research sample. 
Nearly four in nine (44.12 percent) of this group hold the green Palestinian ID and have 
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obtained permits in order to join their husbands who hold blue Jerusalem IDs and live 
within the municipality borders. This permit is renewed every six months, until they are 
approved for family unification. If at any time the application for renewal is rejected 
or family unification is not approved, these women are not allowed to stay within the 
municipality boundaries and are obligedto move outside the separation wall; they usually 
move to Area D.
Those women in this category with green Palestinian IDs have a unique experience 
with crossing the separation wall: because their ID color is different from those of their 
husbands, they do not go through the same checkpoint. Manar is a Jerusalemite in her 
late forties and a mother of five children. Her entire family holds blue Jerusalem identity 
cards, but she does not. 
The wall is a racial tool and restricts our freedom of movement, making us 
susceptible to ridicule, humiliation, and degradation. When I go with my 
husband and children to visit my family on the other side ofthe wall, we all 
leave together by car. But during our journey back home, ironically, I could 
not go with them in the same car and cross from the same checkpoint, due 
to my green ID. I had to cross through the checkpoint alone by foot. I have 
become an object of mockery and ridicule by my kids.12
The third component of the research sample – comprising 23.4 percent of the entire 
sample – are those who live in Areas B and C. Most of these women have a blue ID, but 
they follow their husbands who have green IDs and live with them in their hometowns. 
The Jerusalemite women face many challenges and difficulties especially when crossing 
the checkpoint with their children who have green IDs. Children and spouses are not 
allowed to pass if they do not have permits, said Nadia, angrily, expressing hatred and 
bitterness when speaking about what she and her family go through when crossing the 
separation wall.
They are killing us every day, dismantling the families, and making us 
strangers in the same house. My husband cannot visit my family who live 
on the other side of the all, because he is listed on the blacklist and is never 
allowed to receive a permit. . . . Once I had to take my sick eleven-year-old 
daughter to the doctor in Jerusalem city center, and after a long time waiting 
in the long line, they did not allow her to pass because she does not have a 
permit. I had to go back to Kufr ‘Aqab and then to Ramallah.13
The last portion of our sample consists of those holding a Jordanian or another foreign 
passport, accounting for 3.9 percent of the sample. These women are allowed to live in 
all zones, but they must obtain an Israeli visa, which is renewed every three months. The 
visa renewal process is another sort of humiliation and suffering. Women must leave the 
territory borders, cross the bridge to Jordan and on their way back home, before crossing 
the bridge; the Israelis check their passport and renew the visa. This procedure continues 
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for two years and sometimes longer, depending on the time until family unification.
To get family unification and permanent residence, whether for Palestinian women 
or for their children, applicants must prove that Jerusalem constitutes their “center of 
life.” Until this time, they do not receive social services, do not have the right to work, 
and cannot cross the separation wall freely.
Space, Place, and Displacement
The above women’s stories show how “these voices are constructed, produced, and 
reproduced through the gendered political geography of the space that the voices inhabit 
and arise out of.”14 By considering East Jerusalem neighborhoods through the voices 
of suffering women, “stateless in their homeland,” we explore displacement, political 
identity, citizenship, and legal status – and what degree of “permanent residency” is 
granted in general to the Palestinian Jerusalemites in the J1 area, and the specific status 
of Jerusalemite women with spouses holding a different ID, whether married, divorced or 
widowed. Considering “territory as a bounded portion of relational space, and boundaries 
as a tool to organize these relations,”15 we see space reflecting a rationale embedded in 
the relationship between colonial power and its sovereignty in territory. Perhaps nowhere 
is this reflected more clearly than through the separation wall.
The separation wall places restrictions on movement and forced displacement of 
Palestinian Jerusalemites. According to the Badil Center, 32.9 percent of all Palestinians 
in Jerusalem have changed their previous place of residence as a result of the wall. 
Additionally, 83.3 percent of these were forcibly displaced once in their lives, 9.3 
percent twice, and 7.4 percent three times or more.16 Approximately, this study indicates 
that the majority of those holding either types of IDs – 72.9 percent of women holding 
green IDs and 70.87 percent of women who hold blue IDs – have moved in the last ten 
years, after the wall’s construction. Others moved at the beginning of its construction 
or even before in order to maintain their permanent residency in East Jerusalem. Our 
data also shows that 61 percent used to live in areas to the east of the wall, mainly in the 
neighborhoods outside the municipality borders. Consequently, due to the Israeli policy 
of revoking the residency rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites, women decided to live 
within the municipality borders or in zone D. However, those women who were forced 
to move now live in limbo as regards their new place and political sovereignty. They are 
not considered Israeli citizens, nor are they citizens in the West Bank or Gaza, leaving 
them with no state services or state protection.The unique Palestine phenomenon of 
“wall-based displacement” is ofincreasing political interest in the occupied territories, in 
which political borders are imposed by the colonial Israeli state, persistent in its right to 
decide who is allowed to enter its sovereign space and who is not. The status of stateless 
women in their homeland, living in the “border neighborhoods” of East Jerusalem on 
both sides of the wall, is defined by their status of “permanent residency” as a “fractioned 
citizenship.”
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Nationality and Citizenship Laws
Historically, the legal status of Palestinian nationality has gone through many different 
permutations reflecting the reality of the Palestinian people, for whom nationality and 
citizenship laws do not exist.17 However, after the Oslo accord in 1993, the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) had the power to establish its own an independent nationality and 
citizenship laws in order to harmonize the concept of citizenship. In its early draft, Article 
9 of the Palestinian Basic Law defines Palestinian nationality through either parent: 
“Palestinians are Arab citizens who were residing normally in Palestine until 1947. Every 
son [and daughter] to a Palestinian Arab father is considered a Palestinian.” Later the 
legislative council adopted a formulation that limited Palestinian citizenship to residents 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Jerusalem was not mentioned).18
The PA has partial sovereignty on the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The fact that Israel controls Palestinian borders makes it the absolute authority of 
exception, empowering it to decide who can be excluded or included as a resident in 
his or her Palestinian homeland. According to the Oslo accords, the PA has the right to 
issue “permanent residency” identity documents and Palestinian passports (as a travel 
document) only for Palestinian residents in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as some 
(limited portion) Palestinians that are returning to these territories. However, these two 
documents are individually inspected by Israel before being issued, and are not considered 
documents that accord nationality or citizenship. In fact, Palestinian citizenship legally 
remains subject to an Israeli identity card, since neither document can be issued without 
Israeli approval.19 Furthermore, neither document is allowed to be issued to Jerusalemites, 
who are granted Israeli “permanent residency,” or to Palestinians in the diaspora. This, 
however, is increasingly threatened by Israeli restrictions and restricts the return of the 
Palestinians in general and Palestinian refugees in particular to their homeland.20
Jerusalemite families who live on the other side of the wall (J2 area) generally fall 
into three groups, determined by residency status: families in which all members were 
granted “permanent residency” and hold blue IDs; “mixed ID” families, in which some 
members have blue (Jerusalem) IDs and others hold green (PA) IDs; and families who 
have no residency rights in Jerusalem. Since the beginning of the separation wall’s 
construction, the number of people in the first group going back to Jerusalem (J1) has 
increased, as they risk of losing their residency rights and property in the city because 
they live outside the municipality borders.21 In addition, they face difficulties crossing 
the checkpoints and barriers, as they have to wait for a long time in order to cross from 
one side to the other. 
In the focus group meeting in Abu Dis, two women shared their stories of moving to 
Jerusalem (J1). Amal said:
I was born in Abu Dis, and my mother is from the city of 
-HUXVDOHP DQG VKH DSSOLHG IRU WKH IDPLO\ XQL¿FDWLRQ IRUP\
father [this was before the 2003 law was enacted]. Half of 
my family carries a Jerusalem ID, and the other half holds a 
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Palestinian ID, or lately, they have received residency permits. 
In order to maintain residency rights, we decided to move to J1 
area, despite the fact we own a house in Abu Dis.22
$QRWKHUZRPDQVDLG³,XVHGWROLYHLQ%HWKOHKHPDQGDIWHUDSSO\LQJWRIDPLO\XQL¿FDWLRQ
we had to move to Jerusalem. Some of us still have a West Bank ID; we had to leave 
our house and rent another one in Jerusalem.”23 These two stories show how Palestinian 
Jerusalemite families have no right to decide where to live; they are obliged to move 
into rented houses, as they fear of losing their residency in Jerusalem. Their places and 
spaces are decided and controlled by the colonizer.
For those in the second group, where family members hold different ID cards, many 
have moved to zone D with hopes of getting residency permits for the family members 
who hold green IDs. Nearly half of this component of the research sample – 48.7 percent 
– lives in Zone D; 23.4 percent live in Areas B and C, while 27.9 percent live within 
the municipality boundaries (J1). Thus, the majority of the research population has to 
IDFHHYHU\GD\GLI¿FXOWLHVRIFURVVLQJWKHYDULRXV,VUDHOLFKHFNSRLQWVDQGEDUULHUV7KRVH
ZKRKDYHDSSOLHGIRUIDPLO\XQL¿FDWLRQRUUHVLGHQF\SHUPLWVDUHWKHPRVWDIIHFWHGE\
the Israeli policies and the citizenship laws. Women participating in a Kufr ‘Aqab focus 
group described this impact on their daily lives, including one woman who said, “I am 
now busy preparing for permanent residencies and registering my children through my 
ID. The [Israeli] authorities terminated my health insurance, and I was faced with the 
threat of losing my ID.”Another woman shared her daily suffering of living in the other 
side of the wall: “I spend ages following up with the arnona [property tax], and go to 
West Jerusalem only to pay arnona. As we live outside the wall, we have to cross the 
wall when we want to go to the city center. However, the wall stops me from going to 
the city of Jerusalem.”24
Different reasons forced women to move from one place to another. Our data shows 5 
percent of the sample moved because their spouses held a different ID/residency status. 
Commonly, women are obliged to move wherever the husband lives; if the husband has 
a green ID and owns a house in his home town, his wife is compelled to move in with 
him even if she risks losing her Jerusalem permanent residency. On the other hand, 
women holding Palestinian IDs and married to spouses holdinga blue ID (22.7 percent 
of the sample) have to apply for a residency permit and move to J1 or Area D, proving 
that they live in the same house with their husbands in the hopes that they may later 
EHDSSURYHGIRUUHXQL¿FDWLRQVWDWXV5HODWLYHO\IHZZRPHQSHUFHQWRIWKHVDPSOH
holding blue IDs and married to husbands who hold green IDs have moved to Area D. 
The patriarchal society restricts women’s space of movement, when women always 
have to move to follow their husbands, but not the other way around.
In these cases we examine the fragmented citizenship status of Palestinian 
Jerusalemites who live in J1 and were granted “permanent residency” in Israel. First, 
Israeli law does not integrate Palestinian individuals into juridical and political space, as 
they are not fully citizens in Israel and they are excluded from the national community. 
At the same time, they are included in terms of “citizens obligations,” namely paying 
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taxes. However, their spouses and children, who are non-Israeli “permanent residents,” 
are entirely excluded. And those who have permanent residency and live abroad or in 
the West Bank or Gaza are threatened with the loss of their permanent residency in 
Jerusalem and other citizenship rights.
Family Unification
Historically, culturally, politically, and geographically, Palestinians who live in the West 
Bank and Gaza or in Israel belong to the same national community that was arbitrarily 
VHSDUDWHGE\WKH*UHHQ/LQHLQ7KLVEHFDPHWKHGHIDFWRERUGHUODWHUPRGL¿HGE\WKH
“border” represented by the separation wall since 2002. This resulted in further separation of 
Palestinians in those areas, particularly those in East Jerusalem, with many neighborhoods 
divided into two segments. Nevertheless, this did not prevent marriages across the Green 
Line, which continued after the construction of the separation wall. However, the increase 
in marriages across the borderline25PDNHV WKH IDPLO\ XQL¿FDWLRQ SURFHVV DQ HVVHQWLDO
channel for many Palestinians who are citizens or “permanent residents” in Jerusalem to 
unite with their spouses from the occupied Palestinian territories.26
)DPLO\XQL¿FDWLRQVFKHPHVWRRNSODFHQRWRQO\EHWZHHQ3DOHVWLQLDQVZKROLYHLQWKH
occupied territories and Palestinians behind the Israeli separation wall, but also between 
3DOHVWLQLDQVLQWKHRFFXSLHGWHUULWRULHVDQGWKRVHLQWKHGLDVSRUD)DPLO\UHXQL¿FDWLRQLQ
the West Bank and Gaza as well as in East Jerusalem remainssubject to the traditional 
system of Israeli control, with the overwhelming majority of applications rejected. In 
IDPLO\UHXQL¿FDWLRQFDVHVLWKDVORQJEHHQWKHDFWXDOSROLF\WKDWZRPHQPDUULHGWRPHQ
without Palestinian identity cards (“foreign spouses”) had virtually no chance of being 
considered.27 These women are deprived of their right to unite with their husbands and 
children and to live with their families in the West Bank or Gaza.
7KHIDPLO\XQL¿FDWLRQSURFHGXUHFRQVLVWVRIIRXUFRPSOLFDWHGSKDVHV)LUVWFRXSOHV
need to prove the sincerity of their marriage, the “center of life” of the citizen or resident, 
DQGDFOHDQFULPLQDOUHFRUGIRUWKHDSSOLFDQWVSRXVH2QDYHUDJHWKLVSKDVHODVWV¿YH
years.) Second, if the application is approved, the applicant receives a B1 permit for 
¿IWHHQPRQWKVUHQHZDEOHIRUDQDGGLWLRQDOWZHOYHPRQWKVZLWKRXWREWDLQLQJDQ\VRFLDO
and civil rights. Third, the applicant receives an A5 visa (temporary permit) for three 
\HDUV UHQHZDEOH HDFK \HDU )RXUWK DQG ¿QDOO\ WKH DSSOLFDQW UHFHLYHV WKH VDPH VWDWXV
obtained by the requestor.28 To embark upon this process, applicants must meet certain 
age requirements and undergo meticulous examinations that often take several years. It 
ZDVGHVLJQHGWRVSDQDSHULRGRIPRUHWKDQ¿YH\HDUVEXWLQSUDFWLFHLWUHTXLUHVDQDYHUDJH
of ten years.297KHVHSURFHGXUHVUHÀHFWWKHFRORQLDOYLHZRIVSDFHDQGWLPHDVLWUHODWHVWR
indigenous people. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith notes, Western colonial concepts of both time 
and space are connected to the belief that indigenous people cannot value work or have a 
sense of time, which “is part of colonial discourse that continues to this day.”30
7RJHWWKHXQL¿FDWLRQSURFHVVDSSURYHGIDVWHUSHRSOHRIWHQDSSRLQWDODZ\HURUJR
through human rights organizations. However, whether the application is presented by 
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individuals or through lawyers or human rights centers, it usual takes the same amount 
of time. For instance, in a focus group meeting, a woman declared: “we apply through 
the lawyers, but the procedures may take years, and need many follow-ups.” Another 
woman explained, “I just [applied] through the lawyers, and there is no other way. That 
LVGLI¿FXOWDQGWDNHVD\HDURUWZRDQGPRUH´2WKHUZRPHQEHOLHYHWKDWLIWKH\DSSO\
through the state’s lawyer, the procedures are quicker and cost less. As one participant 
explained, “I used the state’s lawyer, [which] only costs four thousand shekels [about 
1,100 U.S. dollars], but he does not do everything I want.”31
,VUDHOL DXWKRULWLHV FRQVLGHU WKH SURFHVV RI IDPLO\ XQL¿FDWLRQ D GHPRJUDSKLF DQG
security threat, and for this reason the FUL was frozen in 2002 and remains so until the 
present.32 Since the Oslo accords, families in which one spouse is a Jerusalemite and the 
other is from the West Bank or Gaza face an impossible situation, in which they cannot 
live as one family, either in the West Bank/Gaza or in East Jerusalem.33 The FUL acts 
“as an instrument of displacement” in the case of Jerusalemite women.34 The Women’s 
Center for Legal Aid and Counseling has archived many cases of applications for family 
XQL¿FDWLRQDSSOLFDWLRQVWKDWZHUHWKDWUHMHFWHG)RUH[DPSOH*KDGHHUKROGVD3DOHVWLQLDQ
ID, her husband holds a Jerusalem ID, and they applied for a family reunion for her to 
live with him in Jerusalem. The Israeli Ministry of Interior rejected the application in 
1995 and again in 1998. “The authorities told my husband that I cannot live with him in 
Jerusalem but they did not give any reason.”35
In 2003, the Knesset enacted the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary 
Provision), or CEIL.36,WLPSRVHGSURKLELWLRQRQIDPLO\XQL¿FDWLRQEHWZHHQ3DOHVWLQLDQ
Israeli citizens or “permanent residents” and their spouses who are originally residents 
of the West Bank or Gaza. This prohibition did not include the Israeli settlers in the 
:HVW%DQNRUXQWLO*D]DDQGZDVMXVWL¿HGEDVHGRQVHFXULW\FRQFHUQV37 This 
law functions as an ethnic cleansing instrument used against Palestinian Jerusalemites, 
shredding the social fabric of Palestinian Jerusalemite families and displacing 
Palestinians from Jerusalem. 
Violation of the Right to Family Life
Israel’s policy seriously violates the right to family life. This violation is embodied by 
two types of displaced families. In the first type, when one spouse holds a blue ID and 
the other holds a green ID, they cannot live together in the J1 area. If the couple decides 
to live together in J1, the spouse without a blue Jerusalem ID fears deportation from the 
city. He or she hides himself or herself, not moving outside the home, living illegally in 
J1 with no rights and no legal possibility of work. Alternatively, if the couple decides 
to live apart, they will have to endure an enforced separation for many years and, if the 
couple has children, one spouse will be separated from them. 
There are many stories of couples in this situation. One interviewee shared the story 
of her daughter, who has a green ID and married a Jerusalemite who has a blue ID. In 
her words:
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I agreed to my daughter’s choice to marry the man that she loves, even 
though he has a [blue] ID, during al-khutuba [engagement period]. She used 
to apply for a permit to be able to enter Jerusalem to meet her fiancé. Once 
her application was rejected, but she insisted on entering Jerusalem illegally. 
I also joined her, andwe were both captured by the Israeli border guards. 
Since then, we were both prohibited from getting a permit. Even when she 
applied for the wedding party, which took place in the city, her application 
was rejected, but she entered Jerusalem illegally. To avoidbeing captured 
again by the Israeli police, she has been hiding in her house, not going out. 
Now six months have passed since I have seen her, as I am prohibited from 
getting a permit to visit Jerusalem.38
A second type of violation relates to situations wereone spouse is a blue Jerusalem ID 
holder and the couple lives together in the J2 area or another town in the West Bank. In 
this case the spouse holding the blue ID risks losing residency status in Jerusalem, which 
will then temporarily disqualify him or her from submitting an application for family 
unification, as such applications can only be submitted after two years of consecutive 
residence in J1.39 The rationale of this provision, made clear in statements made by senior 
Israeli officials, is demographic, consistent with Israel’s racial policy to depopulate 
Jerusalem of Palestinians and Judaizing the city.40
Identity Determined by Patriarchy
When a Palestinian woman marries a partner of a different nationality, she immediately 
acquires her husband’s nationality and loses her own, even though a “married woman 
should have the same right to retain or change her nationality as a man.”41 In Israel, this 
is the case for Jewish women, but is not applicable for non-Jewish women citizens. For 
instance, Palestinian women who are citizens in Israel cannot pass their citizenship to 
their husbands. Under the Israeli FUL until 1994, “the Ministry of Interior did not accept 
requests from wives holding the Jerusalem ID in order to unite with their husbands [who 
held West Bank or Gaza residency] in Jerusalem. The assumption behind it was that a 
woman in Arab society would always follow her husband and not vice versa.”42
Citing Verena Stolcke, Betty de Hart notes the similar role played by kinship and 
citizenship in patriarchal societies: “Citizenship has a binding function, similar to that of 
kinship systems in society in the pre-industrial era. Both determine the personal borders 
of the social-political community.”43 Patriarchy draws the boundary in a gender-specific 
way and limits the space and place of women. It functions in the same way that citizenship 
laws do, and both can come together deprive a woman from her right to marry with spouse 
of her choice. Samar’s story serves as an example: Samar is a Jerusalemite who holds 
a blue ID, and the man she loves holds a green ID. Her marriage was broken due to the 
division of East Jerusalem, the FUL, and patriarchal society. As Samar narrated her story: 
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For the past five years, my family rejected my engagement to the man I love, 
because he was from the West Bank, and I was not allowed to live with him 
in the West Bank area unless he obtained a residence permit in Jerusalem. 
This, however, was impossible for two reasons. On the one hand, he has to 
be married in order to apply for the residency permit, and on the other hand 
he was less than thirty-five, the legal age that is defined in the CEIL. So 
we had to wait until he reaches this “legal age,” which took us five years, 
in order to apply for the permit, though we still did not have a marriage 
contract. I faced many difficulties to get my family to agree. They approved 
the engagement with only the marriage contract that helps us to apply for 
permit, but they did not allow us to live together until he gets the residency 
permit. Unfortunately, his application was rejected for security reasons and 
my family forced us to split up and call off the marriage.44
This case is exactly what Mazen Masri has described as “love suspended.”45 The 
decision on the constitutionality of the CEIL 2003 and its amendments imposes a 
sweeping prohibition on the family unification process between Palestinians “permanent 
residents” and “citizens” in Israel and Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza. 
The decision directly affects the lives of more than fifteen thousand couples that will 
have to separate or to live uncertain lives. This ethnic law along with the patriarchy 
affects other Palestinians men and women who now have laws that in effect delineate 
who they can marry. This is one of the ways in which the state genders citizenship; 
through the control of marriage, the state intervenes in the private space and uses 
marriage for very public and political purposes, especially in the case of “intermarriage” 
such as those between Palestinian residents of J1 and non-residents from the West Bank 
or Gaza, as we have seen above.46
Palestinian Jerusalemite women holding green PA-issued IDs and married to spouses 
who carry blue Jerusalem IDs have no legal status in Israel and are therefore ineligible 
to receive the usual services that are offered to citizens.47 However, even if approved, 
spouses from the West Bank or Gaza would only be able to stay in J1 under temporary 
permits.48 The Ministry of Interior may grant permits to stay in J1 to spouses from the 
West Bank or Gaza if the husband is over the age of 35 or if the wife is over the age of 
25. These permits can be renewed but do not provide legal status and social benefits, nor 
do they serve as permits to work in Israel.49
Since 2003, the Ministry of Interior has halted all status updates for residents of the 
West Bank or Gaza whose applications for family unification in Israel had been approved. 
Since then, those women have been living in J1 with temporary permits, never knowing 
what will happen tomorrow. They have to prove their “center of life” is still in Jerusalem 
and undergo security checks, with no end in sight.50 This situation produces a constant state 
of instability, insecurity, and uncertainty over potential non-renewal of residence permits.
This law also applies to foreign women (for example, Jordanians or other nationalities) 
whose spouses are Palestinian Jerusalemites also living in the J1 area, and who face many 
challenges and restrictions. In an example from our research sample, a woman who has 
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Jordanian nationality, whose husband is a Palestinian Jerusalemite holding a blue ID and 
lives in J2, shared the following narrative with us:
I have a visa in my passport, which is renewed annually. However, we must 
apply for renewal three months prior to the expiration of the visa. I applied 
for family unification, which was refused as the authorities considered my 
husband residing outside Jerusalem, although he used to live in al-Ram 
[which is located in J2, Area B, and thus considered outside the municipality 
border]. They asked him to live in Jerusalem for two years and then reapply 
as we should wait for eight months and I am still waiting.51
The process of applying for residency permitsentails a bureaucratic procedure that 
the Israeli authorities may refuse to initiate or may not be put in motion for several 
months. Consequently, during the waiting period, which may take years, women and 
their children are unable to benefit from public services, particularly health services. 
Furthermore, in case of a husband’s death or divorce, if the application procedure has 
not reached the halfway point, the woman automatically loses the right to maintain her 
status in Jerusalem.52 One woman shared her experience: “I got the residency permit [as 
a second phase in which she can live with her husband in Jerusalem], but for three years 
I did not renew it, so I lost it. Now I want to apply again, but now it is impossible to get 
it, because my ex-husband got married to another woman.”53 These women are denied 
their right to make their own decisions regarding where to live and when to move. Their 
domains of time, emotion, family ties, and decision-making have all been attacked and 
usurped by the spatial policies of the colonizer. 
As Palestinian Jerusalemite women change their place of residency, they may face 
revocation of their residency status and termination of their unification applications. In 
practice, as well as by law, it is the Israeli state that decides for Palestinians where and how 
to live.54 Thus, a woman may struggle for a long time to be able to live with her husband 
in Jerusalem, but her residency permit may still be postponed if the couple decided to 
live outside the municipality borders. One interviewee, Abeer, received her residency 
permit five years after her husband applied for family unification. Her permit was halted 
because the family moved out of J1, as they grew tired of crossing the separation wall 
and military checkpoints on a daily basis to reach their workplaces. Abeer describes the 
experience of crossing a checkpoint and the hardship she faced:
I got the residency permit to live with my husband in Jerusalem after five 
years of our marriage, and I renewed it many times during the last three 
years. But I got tired of waiting to get the permanent residency, and I was 
suffering from daily crossing the checkpoint through the wall with my two 
children (who are only seven and five years old). I have to put them in 
school near my work. I have to leave home early in the morning, at least two 
hours earlier than usual, and I return home late in the evening. My husband 
and I are working in Ramallah. I lost my first job because I always arrived 
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late. So we decided to live in Ramallah. The Israelis knew that we are not 
living in Jerusalem any more: they halted my permit, and now I cannot go 
to Jerusalem and I am not allowed to apply for the unification again.55
The above story shows how women’s space and time were invaded and controlled by 
various mechanisms of the hegemonic power: in this case spending time every day, to 
be two hours earlier in the morning and another two hours late on her way back home. 
Considering the women’s stories above, we included an open question in the survey to 
explore their opinion about “mixed-ID” marriages (i.e., marriages across the legal divide). 
The question was: “Would you allow or do you agree for your daughter to marry someone 
who has a different ID?” Women’s opinions and responses ranged between rejection and 
acceptance of such a marriage. Our data shows that more than half of the research sample 
(55 percent) would be opposed to their daughters marrying someone with a different 
ID. Their rationalization was based on the problems presented by the Israeli occupation, 
when applying for family reunification, crossing checkpoints and barriers, or looking for 
a place to live. The women who rejected this marriage have experienced the everyday 
humiliation and oppression by the Israelis and feel their whole life controlled by Israel’s 
colonizing power. Slightly less than one-third (around 28.6 percent) of women would 
accept their children’s choice to marry a spouse with a different ID, given that the couple 
loves each other. These women expressed a belief that marriage should not be decided 
by the kind of ID the man carries. Some women also believed that marriages between 
those who carry different IDs enhances the common fate and unity of the Palestinian 
people and opposes Israeli colonialism.
Conclusion
The division of East Jerusalem by the separation wall and Israeli policies and citizenship 
laws created division and discrimination among Jerusalem’s Palestinian natives, and 
gender relations were not unaffected. The result has been the scattering of families, the 
shredding of Arab Jerusalem’s social fabric, and changing the family formation and 
de-standardization. Family and kinship relations are very important among Palestinians. 
More than two-thirds of the families living behind the wall have at least one kin living 
within the borders of the wall. However, under the Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law, mutual visits are usually impossible. In particular, Jerusalemites who hold green 
IDs are not permitted to enter Jerusalem (J1) freely; they must apply for an entry permit 
to visit family for different occasions, including births, marriages, sickness, and death. 
Though requests for a permit can be approved for these reasons, such permitsare never 
approved for those who were in prison (including political prisoners) or if any member 
of the applicant’s close kin (parents, siblings, and children) were in prison, were killed 
in fighting with Israeli forces, or is wanted by the Israeli secret police. Married women 
are the most affected by this situation because they have to follow their husbands and 
their movement is always controlled by the military colonizing power, which prohibits 
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them from having ordinary relationships with their families. 
Displacement and statelessness is often associated with the loss of state protection, 
and experiences of statelessness illuminate our understanding of citizenship. Here, Israel 
fails to protect Palestinian Jerusalemites. The 2003 Citizenship and Entry into Israel 
Law represents a further violation of the residency and nationality rights of Palestinian 
in the occupied Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem. Most applications for 
family unification are not approved by the Israeli Ministry of Interior; instead, it revokes 
the residency rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites. Since 1967, around fourteen thousand 
Palestinian Jerusalemites have had their residency rights revoked by the Israeli Ministry of 
Interior based on a discriminatory system enforced against the indigenous Palestinians.56 
Israeli laws allow the revocation of the residency right of any Palestinian Jerusalemite 
whose center of life has not been in Jerusalem for seven consecutive years. This includes 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who moved to live with their spouses in the West 
Bank or elsewhere, and who thus run the risk of having their residency rights permanently 
revoked.57 After the separation wall was completed in 2008, the rate of revocation 
escalated, evidence that its purpose was, at least in part, to ensure Jewish demographic 
domination over the city. Palestinians are effectively deprived of the basic right to reside 
in their homeland, hometown, and home-space.58
Palestinian Arab patriarchy is being interpreted and reinforced by Israeli patriarchal 
military power, with catastrophic administrative consequences on matters of residency, 
movement, and daily life of Palestinian men and women. In this regime, the patriarchal 
armed occupying power strips Palestinian men of their power in the public domain 
and, in return, Palestinian men seek to assert their power in the domestic sphere, which 
is reflected in intensified relations of dominance toward women. Militarization and 
patriarchy systems join together to oppress women and determine their places and 
spaces of movement, love, work, and choice, as when Palestinian men, under political 
pretext, refuse the registration of their children in their wives’ blue IDs, and demand 
that their wives live with them, even though they will consequently lose residency rights 
in Jerusalem. As is often the case with societies experiencing conflict, dislocation and 
insecurity affect women disproportionately. While subject to some of the same forms of 
oppression as men, they are frequently the ones who are left to care for the family, often 
without the men.59 Finally, the suffering imposed by “mixed ID families” falls not only 
on individual women or married couples in the present, butalso effects the lives of the 
successive generations, whose social life are devastated.
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